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ABSTRACT
Using discourse institutionalism this article traces how Asian think 
tanks have provided valuable input for informing and articulating 
alternative economic narratives in the wake of the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC) and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2007–2008. Starting with the AFC, think tanks began to cultivate a 
move away from dominant western economic policy approaches 
towards more ‘Asian’-style solutions. These solutions included new 
policy programmes focused on creating ‘sustainable and balanced’ 
economic growth and protecting vulnerable populations from the 
negative impacts of financial downturns. Regulatory and institutional 
changes reflecting these new narratives helped shelter the Asian 
financial sector during the GFC a decade later. The GFC also created 
additional critical junctures permitting think tanks to coordinate 
new policy solutions concerning financial regulation and foster an 
emerging regional economic identity. 
Highlights
•  Think tanks as discursive agents and norm entrepreneurs
•  An analysis of ASEAN and Asian regional economic integration initiatives
•  Asian Financial Crisis and Global Financial Crisis as critical junctures
1. Introduction
Over the past quarter century, South-east and North-east Asia have developed a rich and 
varied think tank landscape. The institutional growth and professional maturation of Asian 
think tanks reflects a combination of increased economic development, expansion of the 
middle-classes, and higher levels of educational and professional attainment. In addition, 
solidifying state capacity and often either direct or indirect political and bureaucratic 
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patronage has nurtured the Asian think tank industry. There has been a great deal of analysis 
of, and scholarly consensus around, the influence of Asian think tanks on regional security 
policy (see Job, 2010; Katsumata, 2003; Kerr, 1994; Kraft, 2000; Nesadurai & Stone, 2000; 
Soesastro, Joewono, & Hernandez, 2006; Zimmerman, 2016). By contrast, there has been 
far less questioning of think tank impact in regional economic policy. 
Accordingly, this article examines the role of think tanks in crafting and disseminating 
new economic narratives in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) and the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) up to the end of 2016. Its aims are threefold: first, to determine 
how ASEAN think tanks informed economic policy narratives during and after each crisis; 
second, to analyse how ASEAN think tanks’ governmental linkages were crucial to their 
success promoting new narratives; and third, to discern how these narratives contributed 
to the ‘making of a region’ by fostering an emerging regional economic identity. 
The article adopts a broad geographic scope to capture the diverse nature of the think 
tank landscape in Asia and the unavoidable institutional overlap across regional organisa-
tions such as the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). Data were generated through several fieldwork trips 
throughout Asia, a survey of official documents by state governments and international 
organisations, think tank generated documents, websites, and scholarly publications. Our 
primary focus is on the regional level and on developments revolving around ASEAN, such 
as current negotiations concerning the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). In the proliferation of regional economic arrangements, ASEAN has sought to 
claim ‘centrality’ and a leadership role in Asia due to the Association’s structural position 
in the networks it has helped established. In that sense, former US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton spoke of ASEAN as ‘the fulcrum of an evolving regional architecture’ (Clinton, 
quoted in Caballero-Anthony, 2014, p. 564).
This article contributes to this thematic issue by analysing think tank input into the policy 
debates on regional economic cooperation through the lens of the 1997 Asian Economic 
Crisis (Lim, 1998) and the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis. We frame the AFC as a critical 
juncture in the so-called ‘American Century’ (Luce, 1999) and the GFC as a critical juncture 
during the ‘Asian Century’ (Sachs, 2004). We provide an ‘Asian’ perspective of state and 
regional responses to economic crises, and explore the role of state and non-state actors in 
economic governance in this thematic issue and the literature in general in four ways. First, 
we provide an empirical focus on South-east Asia that counterbalances the predominance 
of European and North American think tanks in the literature. Second, we address regional 
integration debates, with particular reference to the Association of South-east Asian Nations 
and thereby appreciate think tanks as transnational actors. Third, where other scholarly 
analysis has looked primarily at think tank impact on security issues, this paper focuses 
on the equally significant historical dynamic of think tank engagements within debates on 
economic cooperation and development. Lastly, using the concepts of critical junctures 
in conjunction with discourse institutionalism we offer the thematic issue an additional 
analytical lens to comprehend the strategies used by think tanks to influence policy debates.
This article is structured chronologically. After a brief overview of the development of Asian 
think tanks we start with the Asian Financial Crisis where we identify think tank involvement 
in the development of, and transitions between, economic narratives. We then look towards 
the Global Financial Crisis 10 years later to discern changes in think tank demographics and 
behaviours, and their continuing involvement in economic policy-making up to the end of 2016. 
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We conclude with a brief section overviewing the current and potential breadth of think tank 
involvement in economic narratives in South-east Asia going forward.
2. The ASEAN think tank community
To fully understand the unique political situation of ASEAN think tanks and their role in 
the two crises, a brief introduction to their development is necessary. ASEAN think tanks 
experienced a different pattern of development than their corollaries in Western Europe 
and North America. With few exceptions, the first ASEAN think tanks were not established 
until the 1960s. At the time of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the number of think tanks 
in ASEAN countries lagged far behind those in Europe or North America (Nesadurai & 
Stone, 2000).
Compared to Western European and North American organisations, South-east Asian 
think tanks are generally smaller, state affiliated, and composed of – or linked to – an elite 
group of policy experts. The think tank community operates in a different fashion than in 
the competitive and more open systems of North America and Europe, in large part due to 
the nature of state patronage in the region. In the Western world, think tank development 
is multifarious, with institutes of all sizes, shapes, funding sources and ideological dispo-
sitions. Within ASEAN countries, there is distinctly less diversity in all of these aspects. In 
most of the countries discussed here state bureaucracies retain a monopoly on providing 
policy advice (Nesadurai & Stone, 2000), and it was not unusual for think tanks to be 
created by governments as an extra-bureaucratic arm (Nachiappan, Mendizabal, & Datta, 
2010). In sum, ASEAN think tanks have closer relationships to government than is usual 
in Western liberal democracies (Kraft, 2000). Therefore, for the purposes of the analysis 
presented here a definition of think tank is used which diverts to some degree from those 
often applied in studies of Western think tanks. Our definition of think tank includes 
organisations which can be based within public universities, established by government 
ministries, or have been established as legally independent institutions with some form of 
governmental affiliation. These think tanks are party to networks, which can be both formal 
(such as ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, discussed below) as well 
as the more unstructured networks that consist of think tanks, academic institutes, busi-
nesses and policy stakeholders. What these networks have in common is a vested interest 
in influencing ASEAN economic policy-making and formal or informal affiliation with a 
regional governing body. Such close governmental relationships have allowed these think 
tanks to play ‘key roles in determining the fundamental choices for domestic economic 
reform and cooperation among Asia-Pacific states’ and to function as ‘norm entrepreneurs 
for economic cooperation’ (Job, 2010, p. 128). 
Think tanks have used their links to governments to project ideas into policy-mak-
ing spaces and develop an enduring ‘Track Two policy’ presence. If ‘Track One’ consists 
of formal mechanisms of governance, then ‘Track Two’ represents informal mechanisms 
that exist alongside formal processes and are composed of ‘blended’ groups of academics, 
foreign policy and security civil servants, business people and representatives from NGOs 
(Kerr, 1994). These processes, within which think tanks have often been dominant players 
(Soesastro et al., 2006; Zimmerman, 2016), are given considerable weight in the region and 
serve important functions as ‘idea generators and places to propose and discuss, among 
other things, new norms or standards’ (Harris, 2000, p. 501).
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The policy input of think tanks in South-east Asian regional-level policy debates and 
the so-called ‘habit of dialogue’, that is, regular meetings among think tank directors and 
senior staff with other policy community elites, is well-documented (Katsumata, 2003; Kerr, 
1994; Köllner, 2011). However, less scrutiny has been paid to the harmonisation of policy 
narratives through research cooperation produced across think tank networks prior to com-
munication in policy communities. Economic think tank networks, much like foreign policy 
and security networks, share large cross-sections of membership, and it is not uncommon 
for one individual think tank representative to belong to multiple ‘Track Two’ processes as 
well as to be actively involved, albeit infrequently, in the formal ‘Track One’ of ASEAN and 
an individual state’s government (Kerr & Taylor, 2013). The resulting policy communities are 
small, well-connected and consequently have an enhanced ability to coordinate discourse 
across individual and organisational networks, potentially giving them greater capacity to 
influence economic policy issues. 
2.1. Critical junctures as policy innovation opportunities
The idea of ‘critical junctures’, in new-institutional theory, is deployed as the analytical frame 
for our temporal regional comparison. We identify the two crises as ‘critical junctures’ in 
regional integration and economic cooperation in South-east Asia. The idea derives from 
institutionalist theory that posits
a dual model of institutional development characterized by relatively long periods of path-de-
pendent institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases 
of institutional flux—referred to as critical junctures—during which more dramatic change is 
possible (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 341). 
This notion of critical junctures can be used in discursive institutionalism, a theory that 
focuses on discourse as ‘the interactive process of conveying ideas’ and links control over 
discourse to expressions of political power (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303). This article argues that 
each crisis created a critical juncture in which think tanks had opportunities to contribute 
to policy change as ‘carriers of new discourse’ (Ladi, 2011, p. 208). From this view, critical 
junctures are opportunities for discursive actors such as think tanks to inject ideas into 
political processes, thereby influencing policy and ultimately institutional development.
Discourse does not displace but coexists with interests. Discursive institutionalism 
acknowledges that material conditions and hard economic variables constrain policy pos-
sibilities. At the same time it recognises that ‘ideas shape or constitute the situation or 
context of action’ while also serving to ‘shape or constitute agents themselves, especially 
their interests, preferences and identities’ (Bell, 2012, p. 666). In other words, ideas and 
interests can be mutually constitutive (Schmidt, 2008). Therefore, in times of major polit-
ical upheaval it has been argued that ideas, as well as interests, guide policy responses. For 
instance, Blyth (2002) demonstrated that when interests were difficult to discern during 
the economic shocks of the 1970s, it was the dominant economic ideas in a country (in his 
cases, Sweden and the USA) that determined political responses. Similar arguments apply 
during the Asian Financial Crisis in particular, as regional economic interests were unclear – 
or at least not clearly articulated.
We use discursive institutionalism’s three-part framework for our assertion that think 
tanks provided valuable input into the responses of ASEAN during both financial cri-
ses. These responses were multi-pronged: first, developing a regional ‘world view’ (or 
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‘philosophy’) about Asia that has also informed thinking about supposedly Asian values 
and helped define the Asian Century; second, producing ‘programmatic’ ideas such as 
regional integration theories and concepts; and third, proposing specific ‘policies’ including 
institutional developments such as the ASEAN Economic Community or specific instru-
ments for ASEAN financial integration. We concentrate our analysis on the production of 
programmatic ideas.
Discourse takes shape through ‘policies, programmes and philosophies’; and discursive 
institutionalism not only provides insight into the substantive content of ideas but also the 
interactive process by which ideas are spread (Schmidt, 2008). This framework also intro-
duces the distinction between ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ discourses. 
‘Coordinative discourses’ involves the creation, elaboration and justification of policy 
and programmatic ideas among transnational or national policy communities (Schmidt, 
2008, p. 310). ASEAN regional integration processes are a mode of coordinative discourse 
expressed through the Senior Officials Meeting and other Leader’s Summits, the meetings 
of finance, trade and other ministers, and the various think tank networks – at informal, 
lower levels of policy discussion where policy ideas and frameworks are debated.
By contrast, ‘communicative discourses’ are concerned with the relationships between 
policy-makers and their publics. In the ASEAN context, as outlined above, think tanks 
have been involved primarily in the articulation and elaboration of coordinative discourses 
speaking to constituencies in government rather than the general public. This technocratic 
distance is compounded by the relative lack of interest of publics in ASEAN nation states in 
regional affairs (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996), though this has changed in recent years 
and more Asian states have become increasingly democratic (McGann & Weaver, 2002).
Think tanks are carriers of both sets of discourses but do not necessarily undertake both 
equally or at all times. In order to discern policy influence, we pay particular attention to 
ASEAN think tanks and their role in coordinative discourse across the two crises. The coor-
dinative discourse occurring between think tanks and policy-makers in policy circles is the 
base from which to examine the narrative production of discourse concerning economic 
development and the creation of an ASEAN-style economic platform.
We also posit a scale of think tank coordinative discourse. On one end, think tanks have 
been passive legitimisers of governmental policy (Boswell, 2009). That is, they can be used 
by regional policy elites to signal and explain changes in policy direction to other political 
actors. Programmatic ideas on economic cooperation are developed and disseminated in 
the regular and day-to-day activities of website development, event organisation, media 
commentary and publications on issues that might range from maritime security, trans-
boundary energy and electricity markets to inclusive growth in global value chains. This 
is a lesser order of power and policy impact of think tanks, occupying a support role to 
well-developed governmental policy directions.   
On the other end, think tanks can also be policy advocates with an ability to guide eco-
nomic policy through the provision of spaces for dialogue, policy narratives and expert 
advice. In reality, ASEAN think tanks often fall somewhere in the middle, and their loca-
tion on this spectrum changes over time, in tandem with available critical junctures and 
according to waxing or waning policy issues. Think tank narratives which ‘guide’ policy have 
a considerably higher order of power and influence. It is also one that is methodologically 
difficult to demonstrate as there are multiple actors in policy debates with similar – as well 
as dissenting – arguments. For example, university researchers, economists and business 
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leaders interact in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), not only think tank-
ers. Establishing a line of causality from (think tank) narratives to changes in cognition (of 
ASEAN policy elites and decision-makers) to subsequent policy reforms and adjustments 
is not amenable to making a (positivist) case of proof of impact and influence. Moreover, in 
ASEAN affairs ‘words are not deeds’ (Jones, 2016, p. 16) and progress on regional economic 
cooperation has been slow, fragmented, incremental and prone to setbacks (Higgott, 2016; 
Jones, 2016).
ASEAN think tanks are adept discursive actors, and approaching think tanks through the 
lens of discursive institutionalism makes it possible to see how their narratives have been 
used to inform and signal policy in the wake of both the 1997 and 2009 financial crises. 
Discourse in this sense is ‘the glue between structure and agency’ (as noted by Ladi, Lazarou 
and Hauck, forthcoming this edition). It provides the missing link between macro-level 
political economy of ‘large actors’ (Higgott, 2016, p. 15) and meso-level policy processes 
and debates. In the next section, we turn to the meso-level of think tank discourses.
3. Think tank responses to the Asian financial crisis (AFC) 
In July 1997, the Bank of Thailand floated the value of the Thai baht after it determined 
that it could no longer support its value in foreign exchange markets (PECC, 1998). This 
set off a financial crisis that triggered instability in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
before spreading to Singapore and South Korea (PECC, 1998). Financial instability resulted 
in food and fuel shortages, and widespread political unrest that contributed to the weaken-
ing, and in some cases fall, of previously secure political regimes. The region’s response, or 
rather its lack of a response, and its subsequent forced reliance on the economic strategies 
of the IMF highlighted Asia’s underdeveloped and evidently ineffective financial governing 
mechanisms (Machetzki, 2002).
At the time of the crisis there were limited numbers of think tanks operating at a regional 
level, the majority of theses think tanks worked within the three dominant networks: (i) 
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) a non-governmental organisation that 
maintains a close relationship with the Asia’s foremost economic network, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC); (ii) the ASEAN-Institutes for Strategic and International 
Studies (ASEAN-ISIS); and, (iii) the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific (CSCAP) connected with the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
Among these three, only the ASEAN-ISIS would qualify as a traditional think tank net-
work. PECC is more accurately a proto-network because does not have a cohesive network 
structure but instead styles itself as ‘a unique tripartite partnership of senior high-ranked 
individuals from business, industry, government, academic and other intellectual circles 
(Chan, 2000). Likewise, CSCAP is not a ‘pure’ think tank network in that while its members 
are think tanks it actively pursues participation from academic, business and governmental 
communities. Regardless of their differing structures, all three organisations have engaged 
heavily in ASEAN economic policy making and maintain some kind of governmental 
affiliation, though only the PECC is associated with a regional organisation focusing on 
economic policy (APEC). Of the other two networks, ASEAN-ISIS maintains formal affili-
ation with ASEAN and CSCAP with the ASEAN Regional Forum. Both focus more heavily 
on security policy, and tend to view economic instability through a security-focused lens. 
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3.1. Think tank policy narratives after the AFC 
Instead of studying the policy recommendations of individual think tanks, this analysis 
focuses on the development of both philosophical and programmatic narratives, which were 
established by these networks during and after each crisis. These arcs are developed between 
and for policy-makers, thus, we examine predominately coordinative types of discourse. 
Economic narratives shaping regional financial governance have undergone significant 
and identifiable evolutions in South-east Asia. We look at programmatic-level narratives 
first, these narratives encompass the transition from so-called ‘Western’ economic policies 
to the more anti-austerity and post-Washington Consensus policies that have come to typify 
economic approaches in the ‘Asian Century’. These narratives are broader than individual 
policies and comprise ‘sets of diagnostics and prescriptions for action’ that function as 
frameworks through which to ‘set the scope of possible solutions to problems that policy 
ideas address’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). Second, policy ‘philosophies’ are evaluated to iden-
tify how think tank networks leveraged both the AFC and the GFC to re-visit dominant 
ideas on the nature of Asian regionalism and to promote the making of an Asian economic 
region. The most specific level of discourse, policies, is used throughout to provide empirical 
examples of policy proposals put forth by think tanks in support of the larger programmatic 
and philosophical narratives identified. 
ASEAN governments were caught off-guard by the AFC (PECC, 1998), and program-
matic narratives developed immediately after the AFC were largely echoes of neoliberal 
‘Western’ economic principles, emphasising the opening of markets to free trade and 
increased regionalisation as the solutions to the crisis (PECC, 2000, 2009). Up to this point, 
ASEAN think tanks had not engaged in any large-scale type of coordinative discourse 
focusing on economic policy. Thus, ASEAN policy-makers instead adopted economic ideas 
drawn from Western-centric dialogue processes, such as those advanced through the Asia-
Europe Meetings (ASEM), which were at their height in the late 1990s and into the 2000s. 
These dialogues endorsed a European model of regionalisation, and enjoyed strong symbolic 
political capital if not substantive institutional adoption in existing ASEAN structures and 
processes (Beeson & Stone, 2013). 
As a consequence, initial policy programmes, such as the Competition Principles Project 
organised by the PECC, promoted neoliberal economic policies in an attempt to achieve 
‘free’ and better functioning markets, in line with the recommendations put forward by 
the IMF (PECC, 2000). These principles went on to become (with some modifications) 
the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reforms (Soesastro, 2005). 
Similar programmes were put forth by other think tank networks, which variously sought 
to accelerate the growth of an ASEAN Free Trade Area and liberalise the financial services 
sector (Jones, 2016, p. 15; ASEAN Secretariat, 1999). 
These ideas temporarily gained traction, in spite of their lack of adaptation to the eco-
nomic and political environments of Asia. Despite attempts by Japan to develop an ‘Asia-
based’ solution to the financial volatility caused by the AFC, opposition from the United 
States ensured that the IMF was the only viable mechanism for regional support (Machetzki, 
2002). However, when these policy programmes failed to live up to expectations, individual 
countries began to pursue their own material interests. For example, Thailand conformed 
with the recommendations and conditions of the IMF while Malaysia was notable in pur-
suing its own policy course. Machetzki notes that ‘[t]he region-wide ‘economic dialogue’ 
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that was present at the beginning of the crisis ultimately devolved ‘into a “concerto grosso” 
of simultaneous monologues’ (2002, p. 185).
As it became clear that the trajectory supported by the IMF was ill-suited to supporting 
an Asian recovery, think tanks started to capitalise upon the growing belief that ‘the role 
of the IMF as a support body … was not optimal and imposed too strict conditionality to 
ASEAN countries’ (Blizkovsky, 2012, p. 96). From this vantage point think tanks began to 
endorse programmatic ideas that incorporated reactions to austerity politics by including 
individual policies aimed at softening the societal impact of the financial crisis and the 
most ‘detrimental aspects of globalisation’ (PECC, 2001). In 2001, Indonesia established 
a new think tank, the SMERU Research Institute, with the specific aim of understanding 
‘the socio-economic impact of the Asian financial crisis’ (Nachiappan et al., 2010, p. 14; 
SMERU Research Institute, 2016). Policies promoted by think tanks using their coordinative 
discourse abilities were not specifically ‘Asian’ in origin, but rather a combination of ideas 
drawn from the emerging post-Washington Consensus, those put forward by some Asian 
states at the beginning of the crisis (e.g. Japan’s attempts at establishing a so-called ‘Asian 
Monetary Fund’), and reactions to the neoliberalism of the West. While these ideas had 
failed to gain critical mass directly after the AFC, they remained active. Think tanks, using 
their coordinative discourse abilities were then able to adapt these ideas to local political 
environments and transmit them to policy-makers.
The transition from one narrative to the other was incremental and included periods of 
overlap between both policy views. For example, ASEAN-ISIS concurrently promoted the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, while at the same time endorsing greater economic regu-
lation and calling for strengthening social mechanisms to protect those most impacted by 
the crisis. Likewise, programmatic policy ideas also highlighted the need to address food 
security issues, maintain energy and water security in the region, and address long-standing 
development gaps between ASEAN members (ASEAN Secretariat, 1999). 
3.2. Regional integration as a developing narrative 
The critical juncture of the AFC provided opportunities for regional think tanks to cre-
ate, in Schmidt’s terminology of discursive institutionalism, a ‘philosophy-level idea’ of an 
‘Asian-style economic growth’ by recasting narratives of regional integration as important 
aspects of economic prosperity and state stability. Given that the concept of an ‘Asian’ or 
‘ASEAN’ style of economic policy is contested, we limit our definition of this concept to the 
characteristics of increased regional integration and structural reform, focusing on long-
term growth, emphasising economic development geared towards larger social goods (Cao 
et al., 2010), stronger financial regulation, and establishing social safety nets for the most 
economically vulnerable (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011). This section looks specifically at how 
think tanks in the region were involved in the emergence and development of this narrative.
The most pervasive ‘programmatic-level’ narrative to emerge after the AFC emphasised 
the necessity of developing stronger and more meaningful forms of regional governance, 
including institutional reform (Harris, 2000). While the concept of regional integration 
was not new for policy makers or policy analysts, the instability caused by the AFC and its 
dramatic domestic consequences, coupled with the region’s failure to respond collectively, 
meant that it enjoyed renewed political legitimacy after the crisis. The IMF’s contested role 
in the AFC actually served to give credence to alternative narratives promoting ‘Asian’ 
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solutions in the financial sector post-crisis. This was especially so as since ‘[w]hen a crisis 
originates outside the region and the extra-regional response is inadequate or adversarial, 
regional institution building is a logical response’ (Henning, 2011, p. 24). 
By developing coordinative discourse and varying policy scenarios, regional think tank 
networks were able to internally debate and highlight how strict adherence to the ASEAN-
way of governance had limited the region’s ability to act in its own self-interest (Lin & Rajan, 
1999; Machetzki, 2002). For instance, the Economic Surveillance Mechanism instituted in 
the wake of the crisis was severely limited by the unwillingness of some members of ASEAN 
to release economic data, because such data were perceived as a strategic rather than a public 
good (Lin & Rajan, 1999, p. 267). Overall, both ASEAN and APEC were very limited in 
their responses to the crisis, and ‘the lack of formalised institutional structures has meant 
that Southeast Asia has had to depend heavily on bilateral relations and initiatives to solve 
problems’ (Lin & Rajan, 1999, p. 269). 
ASEAN-ISIS, whose network has members in all ASEAN countries, has long-standing 
programmatic narratives of macroeconomic and financial cooperation (Soesastro et al., 
2006). This, along with its endorsement of formalising and deepening regional ties were 
given an additional political boost by the AFC. The network was, thus, able to use the junc-
ture to provide discussion forums and blueprints for how the region could move forward 
in the area of economic regionalism. For instance, the ASEAN Economic Forum (part of 
ASEAN ISIS) regularly engages in coordinative discourse by submitting reports to ASEAN 
about AFTAs and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) (cf. Caballero-Anthony & 
Jawhar, 1999; Caballero-Anthony, 2000; Hew, 2007). 
Think tank networks were able to cultivate and inform new discourses aimed at strength-
ening regional capacity, either by having ASEAN ‘move towards replicating the institutional 
practices of the EU’ (Lin & Rajan, 1999, p. 278) or by other ways of strengthening ASEAN, 
APEC or the ASEAN + 3 (including China, Japan and South Korea) to ‘ensure greater 
financial stability in the financial sector’ (Harris, 2000, p. 495). 
In a sense, narrative reactions to the critical juncture of the AFC laid the framework for 
policy responses that led to Asia’s comparatively successful weathering of the GFC a decade 
later; ‘one can argue that ASEAN and ASEAN + 3 policy responses introduced after the 
Asian crisis of the 1990s served as a basis for the policy framework developed in the post-
2008 period’ (Blizkovsky, 2012, p. 97). In retrospect, it is clear one of the most enduring 
ideological legacies of the AFC is the delegitimisation of economic management based 
upon the Washington Consensus (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011). Think tank networks used 
this change in ideologies to advance new ideas of economic regionalism such as the slowly 
institutionalising ASEAN Economic Community and, later, the Chinese-led and ASEAN-
centric Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, flagged in opposition to the US-led 
and APEC-oriented Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as outlined in the following section. 
4. Changing think tanks in a globalising world 
The think tank landscape in Asia changed dramatically between the two financial crises. 
While the above-mentioned networks still existed, they were now sharing political attention 
with a host of newcomers eager to have their say on both domestic and foreign economic 
policy. Moreover, research initiatives, policy dialogues and governmental steps aimed at 
solidifying regional economic cooperation have strengthened and not suffered the setbacks 
that figured so prominently a decade earlier. 
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These contextual changes, combined with changes in think tank leadership, and the 
employment of new cadres of western and East Asian trained researchers, diluted the per-
sonal political connections that previously characterised ASEAN think tanks. New forums 
for coordinative economic discourse also emerged during this time, which further disaggre-
gated sources of economic analysis and commentary. For example, new regional networks 
include the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia and the Network of 
East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT). These regional networks have become in turn, overlain 
by higher order international networks such as the BRIC Think Tank Council and Think 
Tank 20 orbiting the Group of G20 (Stone, 2015; Widharja, 2012). Many of these networks 
focus, at least in part, on coordinating economic discourse, particularly those of integration.   
The Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT) is a Track Two network focusing on 
the ASEAN + 3 countries (China, Japan and South Korea). NEAT was approved at the 
ASEAN + 3 Ministerial Meeting held in May 2003 and since then has established working 
groups on specific issues of regional cooperation (inter alia East Asian investment and 
financial cooperation over a number of years as well as topics like water resource manage-
ment, urbanisation and RCEP). 
NEAT recommendations are made to the ASEAN + 3 Summit on ‘key issues in Asian 
regional integration processes’. Such meetings have been important venues to openly discuss 
problems and propose mutually acceptable solutions. While the network has access to official 
or Track One processes, a 10-year self-evaluation recognises the need for member institutes 
to achieve closer integration and post-meeting engagement (NEAT, 2012).
Another network of note in terms of officially sanctioned coordinative discourse is the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. Established by a formal agreement 
of 16 heads of government at the Third East Asia Summit in late 2007, ERIA works with 
the ASEAN Secretariat to provide intellectual and analytical research and policy recom-
mendations. It also draws upon RIN – the Research Institutes Network – now composed 
of institutes from 18 member states. 
On top of existing dialogues and research collaborations developed by PECC, ASEAN-
ISIS and others, research and analysis inputs to policy development have become normal-
ised in the region. Or as noted by Li Wei (2015), President of the Development Research 
Center of the State Council in PRC, pump-priming think tank development with ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ is important to ‘offering suggestions, promoting innovative thinking, guid-
ing public opinion, offering social service and conducting public diplomacy’. With regard 
to regional interactions, the public and economic diplomacy of think tank networks is 
particularly important in laying the ideas and defining the interests that will inform future 
institutional policies and development. 
4.1. Think tank narratives of the global financial crisis 
Policy narratives put forth by think tank communities after the Global Financial Crisis devi-
ated from the dominant think tank policy narratives in Western countries, as well as those 
put forth in Asia a decade earlier during the AFC. Policy programmes in 1997, emphasised 
the benefits of ‘free and better-functioning markets’ and equated an environment of com-
petition with increased market efficiency and economic growth (PECC, 1999; Soesastro, 
2005). Narratives emerging in 2009, fully embraced the ‘Asian-centric’ style of regionalism 
and economic recovery that was first floated after the AFC. They challenged and to an extent 
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displaced the neoliberal economic ideas advanced a decade earlier with narratives more 
centred on the ‘Beijing consensus’ (Sohn, 2015, p. 15) which focused on a renewed push 
towards harnessing entrepreneurship, policies dedicated to long-term growth and economic 
development for social good (Cao et al., 2010). Implicit in these policy programmes were 
terms for renegotiation of the economic relationship within and among ASEAN countries 
and an underlying push for sweeping structural reforms. For example, the programmatic 
idea of ‘ASEAN centrality’ gained traction, partially in response to perceived threats from 
non-ASEAN countries:
ASEAN saw the versions of the Asia Pacific Community proposed by Australia’s Kevin Rudd 
and Japan’s Yukio Hatoyama as a challenge to its coveted position in the regional landscape. 
Those proposals compelled ASEAN members to strive to strengthen their collective resilience 
and commitment to ASEAN centrality (Caballero-Anthony, 2014, pp. 573–574). 
While many European think tanks promoted staunch austerity platforms as the way to 
economic recovery, ASEAN think tanks instead focused on an ideology of inclusive and 
balanced growth. The differences between these two platforms is that Asian think tanks 
emphasised development that generated broader welfare gains, with limited environmental 
impact (Cao et al., 2010; PECC, 2009), and accompanying policies that shielded the weak-
est demographics from the consequences of economic collapse. For instance, two of the 
three research pillars of ERIA are to conduct research towards ‘Narrowing Development 
Gaps’ and for ‘Sustainable Economic Development’. Likewise, the RIN institutes issued a 
statement on ‘Addressing Inequality’ through regional economic integration (ERIA, 2016). 
Policy implementation and effectiveness is, however, another matter. 
One increasingly prominent narrative post-GFC, connecting Asia regionally and inter-
nationally, concerns ‘global value chains’. One of the foundational members of CSCAP 
– the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted the ‘policy gap on value chains’ 
in a report to APEC (Goodman & Miller, 2013, p. 5).  The Hong Kong-based Asia Global 
Institute, established in 2011, has become a nodal point in ‘global value chain’ analysis. 
Likewise, RIN reports to ERIA (and constituent member institutes to home governments) 
of the growing relevance of these chains to future prosperity. 
The GFC also further reinforced narratives of integration, with the ASEAN Economic 
Community being a major milestone. ASEAN think tanks have been central and long-
term contributors of policy research on integration efforts through unilateral research ini-
tiatives, network activities – the ADB-Asian Think Tank Network and its Asian Century 
Summit – and inter-regional processes like the EU-ASEAN Dialogue (ADB-Asian Think 
Tank Network, 2017).
The ERIA also argues the need for fostering economic cooperation and emphasising an 
Asian-centric economic development strategy. The ERIA’s final research pillar is deepening 
economic integration (ERIA, 2016) and the ERIA was tasked with assessing the feasibility of 
a Japanese proposal for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia. An ambitious 
Free Trade Area (FTA) proposal that brought together very diverse economies (including 
India, New Zealand and Australia) met with Chinese resistance. The impasse resulted in a 
rebranding and downsizing of the proposal to RCEP. This is centred around ASEAN and 
its existing FTA arrangements with RCEP partners. 
In contrast to both the formally connected ERIA and the informally connected NEAT, 
the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) network of think tanks is a more recent 
assembly established to help improve analytic capacity but also ‘bridge’ research and policy. 
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With a more expansive Asian membership that includes India, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan and 
Pakistan, regional integration is but one of its areas of interest, and meetings have ranged 
across the entire edifice of ADB’s development concerns encompassing poverty reduction, 
inclusive growth and prospects for innovation. However, with its focus on dialogue and 
little practical output the ADBI is more of a ‘talking shop’ that echoes narratives developed 
by the more politically connected networks like NEAT, ERIA and CSCAP. Despite its lack 
of original output, forums offered by the ADBI do offer opportunities for both coordinative 
and communicative discourse between and among think tank and nation state participants.
It is important to point out that many of these narratives developed and promoted via 
think tank coordinative discourse were not ‘new’ but had, in fact, emerged shortly after 
the AFC 10 years previously. The GFC provided the right political juncture, and think tank 
networks the right agency, for these ideas to become accepted and desirable options in 
regional economic policy. Regional think tank networks had already successfully used the 
aftermath of the AFC to delegitimise the policies of the IMF, and the GFC further re-en-
forced the unsuitability of Washington Consensus-based policies for Asian economic devel-
opment. Some CSCAP members saw the GFC as an exogenous shock that they attributed 
to the United States’ overly permissive monetary policies, ill-conceived housing subsidies, 
ineffective corporate governance and bad credit rating assessments (Wolf, 2009). Keeping 
with its security focus, CSCAP scholars argued that the new crisis was a further incentive 
to seek internal modes of recovery and initiate structural change as financial stability was 
also a legitimate security issue (Wolf, 2009). 
By and large ASEAN states’ responses to the GFC were in line with the overarching ‘Asian 
style of economic growth’ narrative that had been percolating within think tank forums and 
circles since the AFC. Programmatic responses included moving away from a reliance on 
foreign capital, reducing their exposure to foreign financial markets, focusing on domestic 
policies to protect domestic constituents in times of economic shock, and strong financial 
regulation (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
driven by the Chinese, is another Asia-centric as opposed to Pacific-centric regional initia-
tive and in large part ‘in response to the absence of reform at the IMF’ (Higgott, 2016, p.3). 
Think tanks used their coordinative discourse abilities to foster regional consensus on 
specific policies as well as overarching policy programmes by pointing out that during the 
GFC Asian economies fared better and persevered with a ‘habit of dialogue’ on regional 
economic cooperation. By contrast, the GFC exposed the institutional and economic weak-
nesses of European and North American economies, spurring the development of the G20 
(and down-scaling the role of the G7) in global economic policy coordination. Asia’s com-
parative resilience was leveraged to foster confidence in new economic policies produced 
by regional governing bodies.
Policy research from ERIA, ADBI and NEAT indirectly filters into other multilateral 
forums: BRICS leaders met on the fringes of the G20 Leaders Summit in Turkey which 
immediately preceded the 2014 APEC Summit. Out of ASEAN only Indonesia is in the G20, 
with Japan, South Korea, India and China other notable Asian members. Yet, the Think 
Tank 20 meetings represent an informal route for participation of Asian policy actors in 
the process as this venue is more accessible compared to the exclusive status of the G20 
Members States. For instance, during the Australian G20 Presidency regional think tank 
meetings were held in Singapore, not a G20 member.
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In sum, ASEAN (and Asian) think tank networks provide a lens through which not 
only to view the region, but also how their ideas shape regional policies. RIN and ERIA, 
ASEAN-ISIS and NEAT, among other networks, are reflective of the overlapping and con-
tested configurations of regional identity. Just as the ‘practice of regionalism and regional 
integration should be seen as perpetual works in progress’, likewise think tank analysis and 
theorisation about regionalism is equally a ‘work in progress’ (Higgott, 2016, p. 18).
5. Conclusions: Think Tank Narratives from the Asian Financial Crisis to the 
Global Financial Crisis
The AFC and the GFC mark transitions in regional economic policy between the end of 
the American Century and the start of the Asian Century. As emerging venues for host-
ing and articulating ideas, the majority of Asian think tanks exited the AFC in a stronger 
position to provide authoritative expertise for governments of the region. Immediately 
after the AFC, governmental institutions, such as the ADB Institute (ADBI) and the IMF-
Singapore Training Institute, at the behest of the IMF, coordinated with both APEC and the 
PECC to conduct ‘a series of workshops on financial sector development for officials from 
the larger East Asian Region’ (Lin & Rajan, 1999, p. 266). Asian think tank networks dealt 
with austerity agendas more so during the AFC and in its aftermath built policy capacity 
and experience to enhance their coordinative functions both within their networks and 
vis-à-vis decision-makers. 
Following the GFC, Asian think tank networks have continued to work closely with 
regional governments on policy issues. For example, ERIA is heavily bankrolled by the 
Japanese and other governments, which thereby sponsor a specific narrative of regional 
integration and FTA policy ideas and analysis. Narratives concerning austerity were largely 
absent, and were instead replaced by an emphasis on balanced growth, increasing Asian 
integration and financial cooperation and supporting mechanisms of social protection 
(Kawai, 2008). Regardless of their unclear direct impacts on regional policy, think tank 
networks in Asia provide insight into the policy concerns and the political fault lines of 
integration initiatives. 
If think tank analysis and networking is most influential in terms of constructing the 
narrative pathways and agendas for organisations such as the ASEAN Economic Community 
in 2015, then they can be accorded an under-appreciated and largely unanalysed coordi-
native function of building consensus through research and analysis, through conferences 
and dialogues complemented by publications, websites, blogging and other forms of public 
communication. In the aftermath of the GFC, discourses surrounding the ‘Asian Century’ 
and programmatic ideas about Asian regional integration compete with western conceptions 
of cooperation and capitalist development. ASEAN and Asian think tanks have been key 
voices in the articulation of policy to deal with emerging economic and financial issues. 
Benefiting from their close governmental relationships, think tanks hold a ‘special posi-
tion in [the] policy process’ that allows them, particularly in times of instability, to ‘come to 
the fore and influence public discourse and thus public policy, by framing the arguments of 
policy-makers and politicians’ (Ladi, 2011, p. 206). This means that think tank narratives, 
and the policy ideas and subsequent solutions based upon those narratives are more likely to 
gain access to decision-making audiences and lead to policy impact. Both the AFC and the 
GFC were critical junctures which offered opportunities for ASEAN think tanks to establish 
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narratives that, in turn, outlined a discrete set of ‘necessary’ policy responses which helped 
shape future iterations of regional economic governance. 
Regional integration is always in the making, with setbacks as well as steps forward. 
Within the wider policy research community, the ASEAN think tank community will con-
tinue to play a role monitoring progress and evaluating new proposals. Think tank input will 
likely be sought concerning the potential successors of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and 
the development of the RCEP in the wake of the new Trump Administration. Think tanks 
can also be expected to continue evaluating changing US policy towards Asia, the economic 
competitiveness of China (and its lead role in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), 
and the relevance of G20, BRIC and other modes of international summitry that overlay and 
impinge on regional affairs. As discursive actors ‘in the making’ of region, think tanks play 
a behind-the-scenes role as interlocutors, and sometimes opinion formers, in the financial 
and economic diplomacy of ASEAN and Asia.
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